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On Civil Procedural Law and 
Liberal Legalism*
by
B D D Radipati"
Introduction
This article attempts to ascertain some of the general features regarding the unity between civil procedural 
law and liberal legalism. There is a fundamental idea that makes this attempt necessary. It is the critique of 
liberalism and its law which underlines much of the current thinking about civil procedure.
To avoid any misunderstanding of the content of this paper, it should be apposite to delimit its purview. As 
will soon be evident, the present study will deliberately omit a discussion o f the actual rules of civil procedures, 
viz., the rules regarding what procedure to be followed; which pleadings to be filed and served; and what 
burdens of proof and of adducing evidence should apply in a given situation. Such an omission should, 
however, not be read as denying the importance of rules in the analysis o f law and its successes or failures. 
It must be admitted though, that a theoretical analysis o f civil procedure and the extent to which the former 
is moulded by ideology, merits the specific focus o f this article. V
The Definitional Stage
The following discussion of the subject-matter o f this paper should provide a convenient departure point.The 
rules of civil procedure (and those of the criminal process, for that matter) aim at the realisation o f substantive 
law whenever judicial dispute arises. The application o f substantive law is the end, the rules of civil process 
are the means to obtain it.* 1 Thus, civil procedural law acts as an instrument for guaranteeing the observance 
of substantive law, or, in the common event that such substantive law is breached, as a device through which 
an injured party may seek judicial relief.
With regard to what constitutes liberal legalism, this paper adopts the following definition thereof— an idea 
that sees an immanent liberalism in law and its power to change social life for the better. In fact, as a 
derivative of the ideology of liberalism which favours some state intervention in the capitalistic economy, 
moderate re-distribution of income, state action to improve the lot of the disadvantaged, legal protection for 
the accused and mentally ill and legal bans on race and sex discrimination, liberal legalism tends to equate 
law with freedom and equality. Hence, its unabashed ability of promising the impossible —  by assuring 
formal equality before the law. But o f course, this equality is rendered meaningless by gross inequities in 
wealth, power and status, both between individuals and between individuals, corporate entities and the stale.
Indeed, it is an exalted and distinctive feature of a liberal society that the purpose o f the law is to simultaneously 
empower and protect the individual. Thus, liberal law must be such that it guarantees individuals’ freedom 
to exercise the choices they make, subject to an identical freedom on the part o f all others.2 To assure that
* This paper was read at the Faculty of Law of the University of Zimbabwe, Harare on 31 August 1993.1 am indebted to Prof. 
David M Trubck of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA for the research assistance he rendered me in writing this 
article, and wish to confer on him the usual dispensation. I must add that I have drawn heavily on his articles referred to below 
which he so kindly sent me, and wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to his writing at the onset.
** Lecturer in Law, Vista University, South Africa.
1 van Caencgcm RC, “History of European Civil Procedure” in In ternational Encyclopedia o f  C om parative Law  (1973).
2 Hence the principle, one’s rights end where those of the others begin.
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freedom, liberal law confers powers on individuals and provides immunities from the deprivations of others.
According to Trubek; liberalism is not anarchy but rather a subject of ordered liberty. It requires a system of 
law in which some action chosen by individuals can be [permissible] or prohibited because one person’s freedom 
[may] become another’s domination.3
In order for law to protect the individual and to serve ordered liberty, it must be formal in its operation.4 It 
must be able to delimit the spheres of freedom and regulation correctly; to define the scope of powers and 
immunities clearly; and to operate predictably.5
The Union Of Civil Procedural Law And Liberal Legalism
Given the premise o f formalism in liberal legalism,6 there must be a correct rule for any set o f facts. And 
granted the premise of liberalism,7 it will from time to time be necessary to apply these rules to those who 
encroach upon protected spheres8 without taking cognisance o f their race, class, gender or motivation.
Those who accept these principles view civil procedural law not simply as a medium, but as a transparent 
one. Indeed, one that does not add or subtract anything from that which is promised by substantive law.9 Put 
somewhat differently, civil procedural law should not make a difference in the outcome o f a dispute. It 
should simply ensure that the process engenders the right answer —  an answer which by hypothesis is 
already present in the determinant system of formal law.10 Another feature o f transparency is the idea that 
the civil process should not have an effect on the values, goals and desires o f those who use the system.11 In 
fact, the civil process will not equivocate in dismissing claims, which, even though they are socially valuable 
or politically progressive, do not fall within the matrix of promises made by substantive law.
Likewise, a peculiar trait of liberal law is its concern with procedures than with substance and goals. Indeed, 
it is common to encounter instances in which liberal legalism cares exclusively about whether the forms of 
legal procedure (such as proper court documentation, service and strict procedural time-frames), and due 
process have been followed, while ignoring the idea that law should be geared towards the maintenance or 
achievement of substantive goals in polities.12 Lon L Fuller, whose thesis13 represents conventional liberal 
legalism in its most advanced version, wants procedure over other principles. In fact, procedural justice in 
the form of an unqualified commitment to due process, before substantive justice, is the explicit thrust of his 
argument, just as with other traditional liberal legalists.14 But as the pre-eminent 20th century exponent of 
natural law, he publicly admits that what he proposes amounts to a “procedural natural law”.15
3 Trubek DM, ‘The handmaiden’s revenge: on reading and using the newer sociology of civil procedure” (1988) 51 Law  and  
C ontem porary Problem s 111 at 114.
4 Ibid. “A formal system of justice is simply a name for a legal system that can draw correct lines and adhere to them”.
5 Ibid.
6 On what constitutes legalism see Trubek DM , “Back to the future: the short, happy life of the law and society movement" 
(1990) 18 F lorida Slate U niversity L aw  R eview  1 at 9.
7 On what constitutes liberalism see ib id  at 8.
8 Trubek op c it note 3.
9 Ibid.
10 Ib id  at 115.
11 Ibid.
12 See Fowler RB and Grossman JB, “Liberalism, law and social change: a preface” (1974) 2 A m erican Politics Q uarterly 276.
13 Fuller LL, The M orality o f  Law  (1965).
14 Fowler and Grossman op cit note 12 at 288.
15 Fuller op cit note 13 at 96.
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Legal Realism And The Civil Process16
A response to the aforestated classical legal thinking came in the form of legal realism.
Realists altered some aspects o f the classical account of law, while retaining others. For instance, they 
rejected the classical picture of legal knowledge as objective and determinant, while holding onto the classical 
notion of the autonomous self. This shift in theories about law had a direct impact on civil procedural 
thinking. The obvious one was that it was recognised that procedure and substance were inextricably 
intertwined.
One o f the results o f the realist thinking on civil procedural law was the development o f empirical research 
on civil litigation and procedure.17 Additionally, the emphasis on civil process was apparent in the proliferation 
of studies o f access-to-justice.18 Thus, the researches tended to evaluate the civil process in terms of the 
opportunities it provided for full participation of affected interests.19 Their results were that public-oriented 
litigation, such as class actions and claims based on the promises of the welfare state, was difficult to initiate 
or continue, given the structural biases and vicissitudes of the civil process system, viz., costs, delay, 
technicalities and inappropriateness.
Notwithstanding this, the researches showed an implicit conviction in the viability and normative correctness 
of liberal legalism and its civil procedural law. Hence, it was commonly found that hindrances to a fair civil 
process could be overcome by formulating changes to civil procedural laws regarding locus standi in judicio 
and jurisdiction; building more court-rooms; availing the public defender and legal aid system to the mass of 
‘have-nots’ and re-organising disputants by aggregating claims that are too small relative to the cost of 
remedies, or by reducing claims to manageable sizes by collective action to dispel or share unacceptable 
risks.20 In other words, the intrinsic values of the liberal system were never doubted; justice was viewed as 
a determinate concept with fixed meaning, rather than as a symbolic assemblage that could be used by 
various groups, both to advance ideological programmes and to throttle calls for social change.21 Expectedly, 
rumblings o f discontent with this line of reasoning were soon heard in some quarters, and it is to this that the 
succeeding discussion will turn.
Progressive Discursivity Of The Civil Process
A significant dissatisfaction with the liberal and realist notions of the civil process gave rise to the neo- 
Marxist and critical legal theory of law22 and legal process.
Starting from the premise that law is ideological and that like other instruments o f the state, it essentially 
expresses the will of the ruling or dominant class at different historical periods, progressive discourses 
questioned some very entrenched notions o f liberal thinking.
Whereas liberalism equates law with equality and freedom, and treats civil procedural law as the handmaiden 
to substantive law,23 i.e., as a process empowering the individual, progressive discourses show how this is
16 For a full account of legal realism and research on civil procedure see Trubek op  c it note 3 at 116 e t seq.
17 For example the 1981 Vol. 15 issue of L a w  and Society R eview  focused solely on dispute processing and civil litigation.
18 See for instance, Cappelletti M (ed). A ccess to Justice A N D  The Welfare S ta le  (1981) and Hutchinson AC (ed). A ccess to  C ivil 
Justice  (1990).
19 Trubek, op cit note 3 at 118.
20 Galanter M, ‘‘Why the ‘haves’ come out ahead: speculations on the limits of legal change" (1974) 9 L a w  and  Society Review  95 
at 135-144.
21 Trubek op c it note 3 at 119 footnote 25.
22 On the literature on this see Hunt A, “The ideology of law: advances and problems in recent applications of the concept of 
ideology to the analysis of law” (1985) 19 L a w  and Society R eview  11 at 20.
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false. They assert categorically, how an individual’s perception o f the law and his or her expectations are 
fashioned by his or her contact with the legal system and its extensions.23 4 So that an individual who has 
discerned the true nature of liberal law will generally be unconvinced about its ability to empower him or 
her through its civil process.
An illustration o f the aforementioned seems apposite. In a pioneering study25 it has been shown how anti- 
discrimination law serves to reinforce the victimisation o f its ‘beneficiaries’. Two factors have been found to 
contribute to this: (a)anti-discrimination law demands the assumption o f the label o f ‘victim’ o f a proscribed 
act, when a prospective litigant would rather not publicly declare his or her inability to cope with unjust 
situations;26 and (b) the fear of the law and the power of the organisations against which a prospective 
litigant must assert his or her claim, in a civil process system heavily loaded against him or her.
This research thus delivers a devastating critique of the realist assumption that more effective procedural 
mechanisms, such as class actions, can by enhancing access-to-justice, effortlessly guarantee that rights will 
be made effective.27
In the tradition of post-realism or critical study o f society, Law and Society scholars have recently articulated 
some criticisms o f adjudication which reflected some discontent with liberal ideas about the relationship 
between law and society. They identified the following traits o f adjudication that failed to enhance a long­
term relationship between the litigants: (a) the winner-takes-all aspect o f civil remedies, in which normally 
one party must win everything and the other lose all; (b) the structure o f the adversarial system which 
encourages each side to push its case to the full without an eye on cost-efficacy; and (c) the backward 
looking feature of adjudication, which seeks to resolve issues in the past, rather than looking for ways to 
maintain future relations. Additionally given the inherent individualism of liberal law, critics of formal legal 
institutions thought that justice would be better served if the norms employed in dispute processing were 
drawn from the communities in which people lived. In this way, the argument went, communities would be 
strengthened and disputes handled more effectively. But progressive critiques have exposed the hidden 
agenda of this de-legalisation effort 28 Some have not minced words in emphasising that a major function of 
the liberal state is to disorganise the masses through the legal form.29 Drawing from this analysis, others 
have seen that
What is new in current informalisation and community programmes is that while up until now the oppressed 
classes had been disorganised at the individual level, that is, as citizens, voters, welfare recipients, in the future, 
they will be disorganised at the community level.30 31
Indeed, that de-legalisation reproduces the class distinctions in a liberal society is indubitable. For instance, 
it has been found that many disputes processed in informal settings possess two distinctive characteristics: 
(a) they show structural differences in social power between the parties and .(b) they occur recurrently.3' To
23 This is a term introduced by Trubek. It is submitted that it adequately encapsulates the toIc of civil procedural law vis-a-vis 
substantive law.
24 Trubek op cit note 3 at 122-123 footnotes 42-50 provides examples of such researches.
25 Bumillcr K, T he C ivil R igh ts Society  (1988).
26 Ib id  at 93-95.
27 This is an adoption of Trubck’s assessment of Bumillcr's book, sec Trubek op cit note 3 at 126.
28 Silbey S and Sarat A, “Dispute processing in law and legal scholarship: from institutional critique to the reconstruction of the 
juridical subject” (1989) 66 D enver U niversity L aw  R eview  437 at 452-454.
29 On a decidedly progressive and comparative critique of the de-legalisation movement see Radipaii BDD, “Informal dispute 
resolution in South Africa: a comparative and jurisprudential study” (LLM dissertation. School of Law, University of the 
Wilwatcrsrand, Johannesburg, 1993).
30 Poulantzas N, P olitica l P ow er and S o cia l C lasses (1973).
31 de Sousa Santos, B, “Law and community: the changing nature of state power in late capitalism” (1980) 9 International 
Journa l o f  the  Socio logy o f  Law  379 at 390.
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the two types of disputes which are regarded as possessing the said distinguishing attributes, i.e., landlord/ 
tenant disputes and consumer complaints,32 might be added the following— environmental disputes, labour 
disputes and such like.
Thus, it is utopian to think of informalisation and community justice as representing participation, self 
government and real community. Rather, they represent an overall social control strategy of the liberal 
state33 —  of controlling disputes, disputants and dispute institutions.
Conclusion
That doubts about liberalism and its legalism should abound, given the structural bias o f the system, is a 
reasonable expectation.34 That liberal law, its institutions and its processes are no longer seen as the 
embodiment o f reason or as a powerful tool for the good,35 is a remarkable discovery.
It is hoped that the foregoing discussion has succeeded in re-conceptualising law and its processes as 
ideological vehicles, with an intrinsic political agenda.36 37To deny this, is to defy reason.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ib id  at 393.
35 Trubck op cit note 6 at 9.
36 Ibid.
37 On how a procedural system may be both ideological and outcome-oriented sec Stein A, “A political analysis of law” (1988) 51 
M odern  L aw  Review  659.
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